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Abstract
Pastoralist conflicts are important global development outcomes, especially in Africa. Analysing rele-
vant literature on this phenomenon, we identify “institutions” as a key but fragmented theme. This
blurs a composite understanding of how institutions affect these conflicts and their management.
Hence, this article proposes a conceptual framework that brings harmony to this discourse by ana-
lysing 172 relevant publications. The framework was then tested using evidence from interviews and
policy documents collected on a typical case in Agogo, Ghana. The findings show that pastoralist
conflicts in Africa are shaped from three main dimensions: institutional change, institutional pluralism,
and institutional meanings. Thus, state-level institutional changes create different institutions at the
community level, and stakeholders using these institutions place different evaluations on them based
on obtained outcomes. These dynamics contribute to conflict management dilemmas. Hence, the
study recommends that intervention efforts examine whether new institutions contradict existing
ones and to resolve them before implementation.
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Pastoralist conflicts are competitions over land and land-based resources between pastoralists or
between them and crop farmers. Usually, herders of livestock, keen to identify pastures for their flock,
sometimes lead the flock to graze on farmers’ crops, pollute water bodies, degrade cultivable lands, or
overgraze fertile lands. This sometimes creates frustration amongst crop farmers and eventually results
in (violent) clashes between these farmers and herders. The pastoralists on the other hand fault crop
farmers and other groups for animal rustling and mistreatment (Baidoo, 2014; Olaniyan et al.,
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2015). In other instances, it is a contest between pastoralists over grazeland. Episodes of these conflicts
have been reported between Bedouin herders and Jewish farmers in Israel (Tubi & Feitelson, 2016),
amongst the Ghaddi of Himachal Pradesh in India (Agrawal & Saberwal, 2004), amongst Somali and
Oromo pastoralists in Ethiopia (Beyene, 2017), and between smallholder crop farmers and livestock
farmers in Southern Africa (Chakeredza et al., 2007).
Our analysis of the trends in global publications on the subject (see Figure 1) indicates that the the-
matic focus of these analyses has been evolving. Moreover, whilst cases in China and India have
received considerable attention, African cases have attracted the highest publication density (including
Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan, and Nigeria). Therefore, zooming into the African litera-
ture (Figure 2), we notice a general thematic evolution from themes such as “natural resources,”
“competition,” and “land use” (2006–2008 era)
to “wild-life,” “institutions,” and “pastoral con-
flicts” (2009–2011 era) and into the current era
of “conservation,” “information,” and “climate
change” (post 2012 era). Generally, “institutions”
form a central theme in the evolving body of literature on pastoralist conflicts. This is noticeable in
our visualisation map and is unsurprising because if we consider institutions as the rules by which
access to community resources such as pasture are regulated, it is obvious how central they are to these
conflicts. Hence, we notice that whether from the perspectives of old institutionalism, new institution-
alism, or post institutionalism (Sakketa, 2018), many scholars refer to the role of institutions in their
analysis of pastoralist conflicts.
Generally, “institutions” form a central
theme in the evolving body of literature
on pastoralist conflicts
Yet, these institutional analyses remain fragmented. Consequently, a comprehensive understanding of
how institutions and their dynamics influence these conflicts, and their management, is lacking in the
Figure 1. Thematic trend in publications about pastoralist conflicts globally (authors’ construct using VOSviewer
based on 733 Scopus-indexed publications).
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scholarly discussions on the subject. This article intends to contribute harmony to these debates. Spe-
cifically, we seek to answer the question: how does the institutional environment in Africa impact the
phenomenon of pastoralist conflicts on the continent? We propose a conceptual framework useful for
understanding how colonial and postcolonial state transitions and politics impact the nature and func-
tion of institutions and which in turn shape the progression and management of these conflicts. As the
analyses would show, these dynamics can be understood from a three-dimensional framework
comprising institutional change, institutional pluralism, and institutional meanings, and a typical case
in Ghana will be used to empirically illustrate this framework.
This objective to conceptualise a common institutional framework for pastoralist conflicts in Africa is
necessary because many of the African cases have a significant cross-border dimension (Gonin &
Gautier, 2016; Idowu, 2017), and as our discussion of the literature would show, there is a shared insti-
tutional environment across the continent. Yet, institution making and interpretation have become
spaces of fierce contention and confusion within academic and policy debates. We notice that the insti-
tutional analyses around pastoralist conflicts have been case-specific and particularised. Although this
is useful insight, the cross-border dimension of these conflicts begs for a general framework useful for
consistency in these analyses across cases. This is what we contribute from this study. Besides, our test
case study of the Agogo pastoralist conflicts in Ghana shows that to understand why some peace efforts
targeted at these conflicts are not successful, the complex institutional context needs resolution, and
our proposed framework helps to achieve this.
The rest of this article progresses by explaining the research methodology and examining the literature
on pastoralist conflicts to reveal three major dimensions of the institutional discourse. These dimen-
sions are then organised and proposed as a conceptual framework, which is then applied to
analyse collected data on the Agogo conflict in Ghana. The conclusion justifies the application of the
conceptual framework and makes policy recommendations based on our findings.
Figure 2. Thematic trend in publications about pastoralist conflicts in Africa (authors’ construct using VOSviewer
based on 172 Scopus-indexed publications).
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Research Methodology
We adopted a qualitative research strategy to analyse evidence from both secondary and primary data.
The secondary sources mainly included 172 journal articles, which formed the basis for the conceptual
framework. These articles are Scopus-indexed publications obtained from the search for “pastoralist
conflicts in Africa.” Analysing them followed a sequence of two steps. First, using VOSviewer
2015 visualisation software (van Eck & Waltman, 2018), we conducted a trend analysis of the biblio-
graphic data. We followed this up with a structured and in-depth content analyses of the most relevant
data aided by the NVivo Version 12 qualitative data analysis software (NVivo version 12, 2019). This
was done by refining the sample to 33 most relevant publications (spanning the period 1993–2020)
using the NVivo text search query for the term “institutions” in the abstracts and keywords. The full
texts of these articles were then subjected to an in-depth thematic cluster and content analysis to iden-
tity the three institutional dimensions. Hence, the literatures that were analysed served both as a review
of existing knowledge on the subject and secondary data for developing the conceptual framework.
This is similar to how others have applied the VOSviewer (Caputo et al., 2018) and NVivo tools
(Johnston, 2006).
The primary data were drawn from semi-structured interviews and policy documents obtained during
fieldwork in Ghana from March to April 2017. The interviews and policy documents were focused on
the challenges faced by the government of Ghana in addressing farmer–herder conflicts in Agogo,
which is the country’s most topical (agro)pastoralist conflict. Two major conflict management poli-
cies, the Fulani Cattle Evacuation policy and a military–police operation dubbed Operation Cow-Leg,
were examined. Respondents were purposively chosen through snowball sampling, based on their
direct experience in the management of the conflict. They involved 21 interviews across four cate-
gories of respondents namely; 10 farmers and four herders/cattle owners in Agogo and Kumasi, three
chiefs (as custodians of land), two police officers and the District/Municipal police commander in
Agogo, and a representative of the Ministry of Interior (in charge of national security) in Accra. The
data from these sources were thematically analysed with the NVivo Version 12 qualitative data anal-
ysis software based on the earlier determined conceptual framework.
Findings
Our comparison of the global publication trend (see Figure 1) with the Africa publication trend (see -
Figure 2) indicates a similar thematic evolution except that the term “institutions” gains more promi-
nence in the African discourse. The term is co-current with the terms “information,” “control,”
“order,” and “pasture” as well as “farmers” and “herders.” Our NVivo cluster analysis identifies
“institutions” as the 30th most prominent theme (after correcting for irrelevant terms like “article”).
In the general sample of 172 publications, the term was associated with other terms such as “policy,”
“rights,” “property,” and “state” (see Figure 3). In the refined sample of 33 publications, the term is
associated with the terms “policy,” “community,” “government,” “traditions,” and “rangelands” (see
Figure 4).
Two main insights are gained from these macro analyses. First, the institutional discourse around pas-
toralist conflicts in Africa has been framed around the interaction between state-led policies and
community-led traditions about the use of grazelands, especially in relation to the engagements
between (agro)pastoralists. Second, these interactions have been framed in terms of access to and use
of information, creating order and controlling the use of pasture. With these hints from the macro anal-
ysis, we proceed to analyse in depth the most relevant publications on the theme “institutions.” Using
this in-depth analysis, we develop a conceptual framework that summarises the dimensions by which
institutions have been implicated in pastoralist conflicts in Africa.
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Figure 3. Thematic clusters in general sample of publications about pastoralist conflicts in Africa (authors’
construct using NVivo).
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Figure 4. Thematic clusters in refined sample of publications about pastoralist conflicts in Africa (authors’
construct using NVivo).
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Institutional Context of Pastoralist Conflicts in Africa: Three Dimensions
Shettima and Tar (2008) consider pastoralist-related tensions to be deeply rooted in the political
economy of Africa and therefore regard the development of these conflicts in the region as a man-
ifestation of what Kaplan (1994) terms “the coming anarchy.” However, these interactions have not
always been conflictual. For instance, in reference to interactions between farmers and herders or
agro-pastoralist and pastoralists, the relations between them were historically largely cordial. The
former offered farm produce in exchange for animal products from the latter (Moritz, 2010),
mirroring the “Cain and Abel economics” that is sometimes found between these actors in the Sahel
(van den Brink et al., 1995). Although conflicts inevitably arose from these transactions, they were
resolved at community levels mostly by traditional leaders (Benjaminsen & Ba, 2009; Tonah,
2003). An important factor to note, however, is that political developments over the years in Africa
have resulted in some institutional transformations and outcomes that have impacted the prognosis
of these pastoralist conflicts. As we have pointed out, and our data indeed show, institutions are not
new in the discourse around pastoralist conflicts. However, the institutional dilemmas facing the
management of pastoralist conflicts are common across the African cases and can be synthesised
into a three-dimensional framework that is helpful for cohesive policymaking and scholarly enquiry
into the phenomenon. We discuss in the next sections this three-dimensional framework, namely,
institutional change, institutional plurality, and institutional meanings. Such thematic analyses are
relevant in any critical institutional analyses (Cleaver & de Koning, 2015), such as analyses con-
ducted in this article.
Institutional Change
Transitioning From Indigenous to Colonial to Contemporary Institutions
The first dilemma concerns the waves of “institutional change” that have swept across the continent.
The first wave concerns the (attempted) replacement of indigenous African institutions with colonial
ones. In a study of conflicts between farmers and cattle herders in the Great Lakes region, Markakis
(2004) contends that the colonial land tenure system paid little attention to livestock production and
thus did not significantly protect the herder community by designating lands to them. According to
Markakis, post-independent African governments have not reviewed land policies to accommodate
herding, making herder communities landless people.
There is also a second wave of institutional change in relation to the state-sponsored decentralisa-
tion in the origin and host communities of (agro)pastoralists. Generally, Africa hosts a very large
proportion of decentralisation programmes being experimented in the world, and this has contrib-
uted significantly to conflicts sometimes by ossifying ethnic identities through formalisation of land
titles as seen in South Sudan (De Simone, 2015). Such a change alters the architecture and motiva-
tions that govern communal conflicts between pastoralists themselves and between them and farm-
ers. For instance, in Niger, pastoral communities contain very useful customary but informal modes
of conflict management that help to manage everyday conflict. Yet, some scholars have identified
that decentralisation schemes induce “the reworking of the relationships among hereditary custom-
ary authorities, elected government leaders, and appointed oficials” (Turner et al., 2012, p. 755).
This relevance of customary conflict management institutions is also noted in Sudan’s dar-system,
which was historically effective at rationing the use of landed resources between farmers and
herders until it was abolished by the government in 1970 without a replacement, thereby creating
a lacuna and setting the platform for heightened tensions between farming and herding communities
(Abdul-Jalil as cited in Olsson & Siba, 2013).
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Our analyses identify three key outcomes of institutional change, which are, changes in state function,
changes in land use, and institutional innovation. For instance, Basupi et al. (2017) note in Botswana
that there has been an increase in the centralisation of land resource management and a growing influx
of technocratic approaches that trump local communities’ experiences. Meanwhile in Ethiopia, others
have noted changes in the property rights regime
through a trend of land enclosures from communal
rights to individual rights (Beyene & Korf, 2008;
Kamara et al., 2004). This ownership regime may
in turn be linked to the increasing modernist devel-
opment interventions by the state which has led to
improved diversification of land use (Hundie & Padmanabhan, 2011) and the rise in crop agriculture at
the expense of pastoralism in Mali (Benjaminsen & Ba, 2009). These changes do not seem universal
though. Galaty (2016) asserts that there are exceptions to this trend in the semi-arid pastoral regions of
Kenya where there seems to be a reinvigoration of communal property tenure.
Our analyses identify three key outcomes
of institutional change, which are,
changes in state function, changes in land
use, and institutional innovation
Other changes are related to technocratic intrusion and border fluidity. For instance, in Ethiopia, tra-
ditional institutions are weakened because of outside actors’ intrusion to distort the application of the
traditional system of common resources governance (Unruh, 2005). Another important change in
Kenya is that there have been profound fragmentation and contraction of the pastoral commons due
to increasing contestation of borderlands (Greiner, 2016). As McPeak and Little (2018) identify in the
Borana-Guji area in Ethiopia, the creation of new administrative borders is the main identified source
of conflict. These cross-border conflicts were also the initial objects of multilateral institutions such as
conflict early warning system (CEWARN) that are used to monitor the outbreak of cross-border
pastoralist-related violence (Hassan, 2013; Kasaija, 2013). The pull and push forces described above
have led to some innovations leading to changes in the type of institutions used to govern (agro)pas-
toralists interactions. For instance, in the Masai region of Kenya, there was the introduction of common
pool resources (CPR) system when state authorities realised that herd mobility is a key feature of
pastoralist resource management in the face of changing environmental circumstances. Before such
a system, mobility of pastoralists had been considered a problem. However, the introduction of the
CPR system meant that the state was beginning to legislate over common rangelands in a way that
accommodates mobility of pastoralists (Toulmin et al., 2004).
Institutional Plurality
Same Conflict But Varied Rules and Sources of Authority
Where different rules govern access to the same
resources, forum shopping leads to conflicts
about legitimacy
The second dilemma concerns the plurality of structural institutions governing socioeconomic interac-
tions in Africa. For instance, in relation to land, Eck (2014, p. 441) argues that it is “the institutional
structure of the legal system [that] is central to understanding which countries are prone to experience
communal land conflict” and that land conflicts are particularly rife in legally plural West African
countries where there exists a heterogeneity
of adjudication institutions to which dispu-
tants seek redress. This argument can be
extended to pastoralist conflicts which are
practically contests over land-based resources
such as water, fodder, and shelter. Therefore, in the contexts where conflict protagonists are used to
and prefer customary institutions for the management of everyday conflict, the advent of neoliberally
decentralised institutions (e.g., law courts) could increase the avenues for forum shopping. For
instance, in Ethiopia, there are various but usually incongruent means for conflict actors to renegotiate
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institutional rules to lay claims to land (Lenaerts et al., 2014). Where different rules govern access to
the same resources, forum shopping leads to conflicts about legitimacy.
Beyene and Korf (2008) also identify the role that decentralisation could play in either exacerbating or
mitigating the problem of institutional pluralism. As they observe in the Somali region of Ethiopia,
the regional state has handed over definition of communal versus private user rights to clan rule with
ambivalent results: Elite capture has encouraged some clan elites to drive forward a politics of enclosure,
which excludes asset–poor households from benefit streams, encourages unsustainable land use practices
(such as charcoal production as windfall gain) and disturbs customary reciprocity patterns among and
between clans potentially encouraging violent disputes over resource access (p. 17).
Such developments have led to the redefinition of the relationship between the state and traditional
authorities, which affects the nature of human interactions (Beyene & Korf, 2008, p. 17). In the Borana
rangelands of Ethiopia, certain national policies already yield conflicts of authority between traditional
and formal institutions, thereby burning bridges for cooperation leading to associated conflicts (Kamara
et al., 2004). The availability of these plural institutions is also observed in how “different types of con-
flict are taken to different conflict resolution institutions” in Kenya (McPeak & Little, 2018, p. 119).
From the above scenarios, it may be tempting to think of plural institutions as only a bane to peaceful
cooperation between (agro)pastoralists. Yet, pluralism does not only involve competing but sometimes
complementary interaction: between state or government institutions on one hand and customary or
traditional institutions on the other hand. Also, there is this complementary interaction between
so-called informal institutions and formal institutions. Galaty (2016), for instance, has argued, with
evidence from Kenya, “that property is best seen both as a formal state-of-law and an informal
state-of-practice, of holding, using and claiming values, most importantly in land” (pp. 724–725).
We consider this a suggestion that institutional pluralism should be considered a normal feature of the
pastoral resource management practice. Cleaver (2001) also provides a case of positive institutional
pluralism in Tanzania, where cross-cultural institutional borrowing is important in the relationship
between formal and informal actors in the management of the commons.
Hence, most scholars’ proposals for improving institutional governance calls for accommodating more
rather than less institutional pluralism. Marcussen (1994), for instance, argues that the retreat of the
state to make room for civil society should not be complete and suggests a type of coexistence between
these two forms of institutions. Also, some have argued using evidence from the Sahel that any inno-
vation in institutions aimed at solving pastoralist conflicts is doomed to fail if they do not incorporate
pastoralist perspectives into state-funded institutional provisions (Bonfoh et al., 2016). Although we
agree to accommodating plural institutions in (agro)pastoral resource governance, our case study
would show that where this accommodation involves contradicting rules, conflicts persist, and their
management is challenged.
There are other salient dimensions of plurality. For instance, we identify a link between national and
international institutions. In this mix, there is a complex relationship between what the state institu-
tions provide and what the international institutions like the CEWARN have to offer amongst states
in the Great Lakes region (Kasaija, 2013). Another dimension of pluralism occurs in the context of
armed conflicts. As Unruh (2005) points out, in the context of armed conflict, effective rule-making
is weakened because few institutions can endure such stresses of armed conflict. As would be indicated
in our case analysis, pastoralist conflict situations lead to the birth of new rule interpretations that com-
plicate already laid down arrangements for determining rights and control over the use of the
commons.
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Institutional Meanings
Distributional Outcomes Influence Actors’ Evaluation of Institutions
A third dilemma concerns the plurality of meanings attached to institutions for conflict management,
which is largely a by-product of institutional change and institutional pluralism. Here also, Eck’s
(2014) study on land tenure in West African countries concludes that “when there are competing jur-
isdictions with overlapping mandates, the legitimacy of the system is undermined and the resultant
incentive structure for people to settle disputes extrajudicially through the use of vigilante measures
is enhanced” (p. 451). Hence, institutions regulating the commons use in (agro)pastoralist commu-
nities could have outcomes that give some actors
agency to alter or maintain the national and local
policies to their benefit. An example is observed
by Benjaminsen and Ba (2009) in the inland Niger
delta of Mali where jowros (managers of pasture)
have gradually lost power to the previously under-
privileged rimaybé (low caste farmers). The social and economic outcomes that stakeholders receive
from applying institutions are what represent the meanings of those institutions. A discussion of some
of the literature in the next paragraph links some of these outcomes to different areas such as informa-
tion sharing, (lack of) access to property, entrenchment or denial of rights and ownership, changes or
introduction of power asymmetries, the onset of conflicts, and the achievement of economic benefits
and livelihoods.
The social and economic outcomes that
stakeholders receive from applying
institutions are what represent the
meanings of those institutions.
For instance, in Botswana, mobile pastoralists are concerned with their ability to provide for their herds
and seasonal movements served as a means of controlling such grazing lands (Basupi et al., 2017). This
also has implications for human rights since mobile populations under international human rights laws
are allowed to have access to resources and services (Bonfoh et al., 2016). At the national and local
levels, institutions mean the ability to negotiate customary rights to property (Beyene, 2009;
Hundie & Padmanabhan, 2011), endorsement of farmers’ private rights to croplands (Kamara et al.,
2004) or the security of collective rights (Toulmin et al., 2004). Another dimension is access, such
as access to markets for (agro)pastoral products (Reda, 2015) and access to information and training
for pastoralists to improve their bargaining position (Toulmin et al., 2004). Other implications of
institutions are determined by the ability to maintain a diversified livelihood (Amede et al., 2020),
especially for the women and the poor in society (Hundie & Padmanabhan, 2011; Reda, 2015).
A Conceptual Framework
Informed by the discussions above, we propose a conceptual framework that highlights a relationship
between three dimensions of the institutional discourse that we trace in our data. This framework draws
attention to the cumulative, multidimensional, and multilayered nature of the institutional environment
within which pastoralist conflicts occur in Africa.
In Figure 5, institutional change sits at the core of the institutional environment within which pastor-
alist conflicts occur. We argue that there exists a relationship between the three institutional dimen-
sions that we have highlighted in the previous section. Thus, changes to institutions in Africa,
especially at the macro level (national or state), trigger changes in the local institutions closest to the
setting within which pastoralist conflicts occur. As our case analysis would illustrate, this can be exem-
plified by the rise of colonial (and later modern state) institutions and their eventual competition with
existing indigenous ones. It may also be illustrated by the collapse of the state because of civil war
leading to the influx of unchecked small arms and light weapons, such as already referenced in
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Ethiopia (Unruh, 2005). Such macro-level changes lead to meso-level changes in the type of structural
institutions that (co)exist within a region or community. For instance, the persistence of traditional
governance may mean that traditional arbitration systems coexist with Western-style court systems
as would be illustrated in our case study. Eventually, this plurality leads to outcomes that have different
social and economic implications for the different members of the community in conflict. As our case
would show, these perceived outcomes lead actors within the conflict setting to either support or reject
the status quo institutional framework used to manage the conflict.
Our conceptual framework posits that institutional change produces plurality, which in turn engenders
varied meanings. As indicated in our diagram, this process may be reversible where changing mean-
ings could create incentives for the sponsoring of more parallel institutions, and over, time the insti-
tutional trade-offs may gather colossal momentum to induce a macro institutional change. Although
our case does not illustrate such a process, we con-
tend that this macro institutional change can
become possible in a context where community
actors unite to accept local or informal rules at the
expense of state level or formal ones. Hence, pro-
ponents of the latter would have to modify them to keep their relevance. Nevertheless, in this reversed
process, we expect the change to be less gradual than vice versa. In the next section, we use our case in
Agogo, Ghana, to illustrate our proposed conceptual framework and the relationship between the var-
ious institutional dimensions within which pastoralist conflicts progress and are managed.
Our conceptual framework posits that
institutional change produces plurality,
which in turn engenders varied meanings.
Case Analysis
The Institutional Context of the Agogo Farmer–Herder
Conflicts in Ghana
Although a peaceful democratic state in West-Africa, Ghana has had its own spread of pastoralist con-
flicts dotted across the country. Amongst these conflicts in Ghana, a prominent case is the vastly
destructive and frequent relapse of clashes between so-called Fulani herdsmen and crop farmers in
Agogo, in the Ashanti Akyem North District of the Ashanti region since the 1980s. The district has
Figure 5. Conceptual framework: Institutional environment of pastoralist conflicts in Africa.
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an enabling climate of good vegetation, making it very suitable and increasing the activities of both
crop cultivation and livestock rearing and consequently increasing occasions of conflict (Kuusaana
& Bukari, 2015). From 2001 to 2016, the Agogo conflicts claimed over 40 human lives and led to the
killing of 600 cattle and destruction of extensive farmlands and crops (Bukari, 2017, p. 143). Since the
turn of the millennia, successive governments in Ghana have sought to resolve the conflict through
many approaches, including amongst others, police and military intervention, mediation, and ejection
of herders from the community (Paalo, 2020).
For about a decade, two of the most applied approaches to addressing the conflicts in Agogo and its
environs have been efforts at ejecting the Fulani through the Agogo Fulani Cattle Evacuation policy
(Agogo Fulani Cattle Evacuation Plan Committee Report, 2012) and a military–police operation—
Operation Cow-Leg (Baido, 2014; Paalo, 2020). The former is a policy by the government to move
the herdsmen out of the Agogo community, and the latter is the police–military crackdown interven-
tion any time violence ensues. However, both approaches ultimately target the eviction of Fulani
herdsmen from Ghana (Interview, police infor-
mant, Kumasi, April 1, 2017). The Herder Expul-
sion policy was enacted by the regional Security
Council in 2010 in reaction to numerous demon-
strations and agitations by citizens of the host com-
munity against the herders (Agogo Fulani Evacuation Plan Committee Report, 2012; Interview
Krontihene, March 26, 2017). Its major recommendation was to expel Fulani herders from the Agogo
traditional area, and this recommendation was upheld by the Court on January 20, 2012 (High Court in
Kumasi, 2012). Nevertheless, the conflict keeps recurring despite various conflict resolution and
peacebuilding attempts. The recurrence of the Agogo (agro)pastoralist conflict is explained by its com-
plex institutional context. This complex context is occasioned by temporal changes to institutions, their
plural existence within the community, and the contrasting meanings that they yield for stakeholders.
The recurrence of the Agogo
(agro)pastoralist conflict is explained by
its complex institutional context.
Institutional change: In terms of institutional change, the policies of both colonial and postcolonial
governments have greatly altered the functioning of traditional institutions such as chieftaincy, chang-
ing the dynamics of the conflict and peace interventions altogether. In an interview at his palace in
Agogo, the Krontihene—customarily the spokesperson for chiefs in the paramountcy—indicated that
because the colonial government was rather interested in cocoa and minerals (e.g., gold and diamond)
than livestock, the land administration did not provide for cattle rearing and herding. The then colonial
government’s non-commitment to the livestock industry is corroborated by archival records (see
Caruth, 1932), and interviews with some herders and cattle owners who lamented that although the
chiefs usually grant the herder community land to settle, the Lands Commission and the district assem-
bly usually decline to validate such lands as legitimately acquired. They argue that this is because the
state has favoured crop farming to livestock. This scenario is further complicated by the understanding
within the Agogo traditional area and Ghana as a whole, that herdsmen (usually, the Fulani) in Ghana
are considered foreigners because most migrate from neighbouring Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, and
Guinea (Baido, 2014; Tonah, 2003). The question of autochthony is relevant in the conflict discourse
and is complicated by the cross-border pastoralist exploits. As an officer of Ghana’s Interior Ministry
dealing with this conflict acknowledges, despite the attempt to create cross-border legislation to make
it easy for movements across West-Africa, the “foreigner-indigene” aspect of the conflict remains pro-
nounced. This is because member states fail to synchronise the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) protocols with local norms and laws (Interview, head of research, Ministry of the
Interior, Accra, March 31, 2017).
Besides, the decentralisation policies of the post-independence Ghana governments further place local
authority under political representatives at the district assemblies, regarding issues such as settling
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farmer–herder disputes, which was hitherto the responsibility of chiefs and other traditional leaders. To
assert the significance of their precolonial and early post-independence position, the chiefs strongly
advocated for and are usually part of the state-led peace interventions, especially peace negotiations
between farmers and herders. Given their vast control over land and continuous relevance amidst the
modern governance structure, the chiefs allocate lands for projects and economic activities, whilst the
Lands Commission issues official documents to validate the ownership or transaction over the land
(Interview, Krontihene, Agogo, March 26, 2017). Yet, as already mentioned and would be further dis-
cussed in the next paragraph, the lack of cooperation between these two authority points has created
conflicts about legitimate ownership of these resources.
Institutional plurality: The morphing of the institutions in charge of land allocation and management
led to the rise of plural institutions at the regional and community levels, and this impedes peacebuild-
ing processes and outcomes. For instance, all the respondents indicated that although the Agogo con-
flicts were historically usually customarily mediated, this role has been replaced by the local state
courts. Yet, chiefs and traditional representatives serving as customary interpreters of land ownership
rules form part of the liberal court procedures and outcomes. Also, land management, which in the
Agogo area resides in customary ownership, has become increasingly formalised, and the latter claims
superior authority in transferring or legalising land ownership for economic activities (Interviews
Agogo youth and farmers representatives, Agogo, March 28, 2017). Such institutional hybridity
intended as complementary has rather created plurality of institutions, leading to confusion and lim-
iting the peacebuilding potential of both state and non-state actors. This confusion is complicated
by the operations of partisan politics, whereby politicians campaign based on the dynamics of the con-
flicts for votes, but cannot sustainably address the conflict as promised, due to the deeply conflictual
and confounding mix of institutions and actors (Interview, police informant, Kumasi, April 1, 2017).
Similarly, the hybrid institutions cause political ecologies, in which “identity conflicts emerge,
because of the formation of alliances within and across the traditional and state institutions, based
on individual or group interest in the conflict” (Interview, Divisional police commander,
Konongo-Agogo, March 25, 2017).
Institutional meanings: The plurality of institutional arenas, in turn, leads to plurality of
meaning-making not only amongst conflict parties but also amongst policymakers. This is due mainly
to the mixed (and sometimes) conflicting policy interventions the successive governments of Ghana
have used to manage the conflict. These conflicting policies have been characterised by the
deep-seated ambivalence in the successive government’s intervention to expel the herders. On one
hand, the government promotes expulsion whilst at the same time providing lands to herders. As the
Fulani representatives explain, “initially the high court ruled that the land is a forest reservation.
The government intervened and settled the matter . . . to prevent conflict the government allocated a
different place for us” (Interview, cattle owner and representative of Fulani in Ghana, March 29,
2017). A major example of this ambivalence is that although both the operation cow leg and Fulani
evacuation plan intend to eject the Fulani herders from their host communities and ultimately out
of the country, the government of Ghana set up the national cattle ranching policy in 2017 to settle
herders in large tracts of ranches in strategic locations within the country (Interview, Divisional Police
Commander, Konongo-Agogo, March 25, 2017). According to a police informant and some cattle
owners (in separate interviews), such contradiction occurs because state officials are stuck between
observing ECOWAS protocols of free movement and establishment of regional citizens whilst also
yielding to the host communities’ pressure to expel herders and preserve local land rights.
Furthermore, the Fulani view the policies as hostile and unacceptable, and they make both cultural and
legal arguments to support this. They consider the expulsion policies as a contradiction of West
African subregional policies on the free movement of persons (ECOWAS protocol, 1979). They also
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interpret it as a loss of their access or right to the use of resources that they sometimes believe were
rightfully acquired. For instance, Alhaji Gurusa, a prominent representative of the Fulani community
in Ghana, and cattle owner, asserts in an interview that “the chief gave me the land because I am a
Ghanaian . . . they (the Agogo leaders) say the Fulani herdsmen are not southerners, among others, but
some local people do not even agree with such arguments, others agree” (Interview, cattle owner and
representative of Fulani in Ghana, March 29, 2017). The citizenship claim here suggests what he con-
siders to be at stake in this matter; that Ghanaians can have access to land but non-Ghanaians cannot.
On the contrary, the traditional leaders of the host community say, “we do not have indigenous Fulani
people here. They are aliens in Ghana” (Interview, Krontihene, March 26, 2017). The farmers then
blame state actors for conniving with cattle owners and herders not to carry through the ejection plan.
Although these herders and cattle owners may not be indigenous to the Agogo community, they argue
their citizenship through Chapter 3 of the current constitution, which provides various routes to citizen-
ship (Constitution of Ghana, 1992). At the courts where these matters have been contested, the formal
institutions weigh heavier than community considerations of heredity and ancestry. We, therefore, see
a tension between the formal statutes for defining citizenship clashing with the traditional and custom-
ary interpretations of citizenship. For officers at the Ministry of Interior, this web of (mis)interpreta-
tions has hampered the successful implementation of the operation cow leg and herder expulsion
policies and most of the mechanisms to address the conflict. Individuals within each group
(policymakers, farmers, herders, women, men, etc.) think differently about who benefits from the sta-
tus quo or existing institutions (Interview, head of research, Ministry of Interior, Accra March 31,
2017). Indeed, as the earlier interview narratives indicate, these meanings are usually neither fixed
against nor for any group. At some point, farmers feel herders benefit from the status quo, and the
reverse is true where herders feel the policies are meant to deprive them of their resources. Others
have also pointed to politicians as the beneficiaries. These meanings are fluid and depend on what out-
come is being considered by a stakeholder in a particular circumstance. Nevertheless, these different
interpretations arise because of the alternative but contradictory rules that apply.
In summary, the analysis of this case largely conforms to our conceptual framework, but it offers even
more insight. For instance, it points to a closer and direct connection between institutional plurality and
institutional meaning. We notice that even though the plurality of institutions leads to plural meanings,
actors rationalise their interpretations by drawing in more references to other parallel institutions. In this
case, for instance, it was not just between customary and state courts, but also actors referred to ECO-
WAS protocols and the national constitution. The lesson then here is that the institutional reference point
informing why conflict parties take certain actions may be farther than their immediate environments.
Conclusions and Recommendation
This article demonstrates the temporal persistence but fragmentation of “institutions” as a key theme in
pastoralist conflict studies in Africa. Hence, the objective was to offer a conceptual framework to har-
monise the understanding of how institutions impact these conflicts and to demonstrate its empirical
validity using a typical case in Ghana. We identified three main dimensions through which institutions
impact such conflicts, namely, institutional change, institutional pluralism, and institutional meanings.
We argue that these themes are connected in a logical flow. First, there is institutional change, which
largely occurs by the replacement or reshuffle of institutions at the national or subregional level
(macro) as the state transitions from native governance to colonial governance, to democratic govern-
ance. These transitions and the institutional remnants of each governance regime lead to the coexis-
tence of multiple institutional forms available for actors at the community level to use in governing
access to resources such as pasture. Then, as actors engage with these institutions, the distributional
outcomes lead to different meanings actors attach to these institutions in terms of whether they are
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useful or not, fair or unfair, or legitimate or illegitimate. These meanings lead to either cooperation or
resistance to the macro- and meso-level rules and policies that are installed for regulating access to
these common resources.
From the research point of view, we demonstrate with our test case study how our framework can be
helpful for case-based analyses of pastoralist conflicts in Africa. As we show in the typical (agro)pas-
toralist conflict case in Agogo, Ghana, these institutional dimensions individually and more cumula-
tively could inhibit sustainable peace. In other cases, perhaps they may engender cooperation. The case
indeed validates our framework that the macro-level shift from customary to technocratic governance
ushered in a history of institutional pluralities, making it difficult for state agents or community
members to fully agree on a policy to address the conflicts. We consider that our framework may
be applicable to cases beyond Africa, but we admit the limitations of such an application considering
that we use Africa-focused data in arriving at this framework. In that sense, similar application of our
methodology or framework on cases outside the African continent may yield other helpful insights.
From the policy point of view, we propose that the prognosis and management of pastoralist conflicts
in Africa are enhanced by an application of this three-dimensional framework. For instance, subregio-
nal bodies in Africa are taking steps to stem (agro)pastoralist conflicts by making policies to regulate
cross-border (agro)pastoralist interactions. In this regard, one main area of dilemma highlighted by our
case is the question of whether it is state-centric definitions of citizenship and associated rights or
rather customary definitions of citizenship and rights at the community or village level that matter
in determining access to resources. Our case shows that the state-level definition of citizenship seeks
more accommodation, but this sometimes loses touch with the community approach, which is more
restrictive. Hence, these two frames need to be better connected and made complementary.
Finally, we acknowledge that given the different nodes of meanings and negotiations surrounding
policies for peace, it may be difficult to address all the changes, pluralities, and largely conflic-
tual meanings attached to such policies. Yet, a
small starting point is useful. Policy proposals
to address pastoralist conflicts should examine
whether new institutions conflict with existing
ones and to resolve them before implementation.
When these considerations hold a central posi-
tion in discourses on pastoralist conflicts, the likelihood of policy success is enhanced.
Policy proposals to address pastoralist
conflicts should examine whether new
institutions conflict with existing ones and
to resolve them before implementation
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